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Moral Hazard and Merit Rating over Time: 
An Analysis of Optimal Intertemporal 
Wage Structures 
W. KIP VISCUSI 
University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 
and Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 
I. Introduction 
A fundamental problem that has been the focus of much work in agency theory has been the 
design of contracts to provide insurance to risk-averse agents and to elicit appropriate levels 
of effort.' In the context of insurance, the problem is viewed as one of moral hazard whereby 
the insured agent will reduce the level of his precautions to prevent an accident if he is 
insured against the adverse outcome. In the labor market context, the problem is one of 
providing effective work incentives while at the same time promoting the risk-sharing ele- 
ment of contracts. The overall structure of the analyses is quite similar whether or not the 
focus is on the insurance market, the labor market, or principal-agent problems in general. 
For concreteness, this paper addresses the labor market incentives problem. 
The labor market problem is complicated by the firm's inability to observe the worker's 
ability and effort and also by stochastic elements that impede a firm's attempts to make more 
indirect inferences using output to assess the worker's productivity-related efforts. This 
combination of uncertainty and the need to create incentives takes on added importance in 
the case of workers who are risk-averse. The presence of risk aversion often mitigates the 
emphasis the firm can place on incentive creation, as there is a desire on the part of workers 
to have stable income streams. Complete equalization of one's income level across states to 
promote insurance will, however, remove the differential rewards needed to provide an 
incentive for individuals to expend effort. 
This inevitable tradeoff between the work incentive and insurance function of contracts 
has been studied in detail for single-period contracts. The focus of my analysis here will be 
on how these influences affect he multi-peiiod wage structure. Although there has been 
research on the multi-period incentives problem2 and on the role of moral hazard in multi- 
period contexts,3 there is no literature on the optimal design of a merit rating system over 
1. For general reviews of these issues, see Arrow [1] and Pratt and Zeckhauser [9]. Other research dealing with 
this class of issues includes the papers by Arrow [2], Ehrlich and Becker [3], Pauly [7, 8], Shavell [11, 12], Spence and 
Zeckhauser [13], and Viscusi [15]. 
2. The most recent paper of this tyre is that of Rogerson [10]. 
3. See, in particular, Viscusi [15]. 
1068 
MORAL HAZARD AND MERIT RATING 1069 
time for situations in which the principal is learning about the agent's riskiness over time, 
which is the fundamental element involved in merit rating. 
After introducing the analysis of worker effort in section II, I analyze the properties of 
the multi-period wage structure in section III and explore the implications for multi-period 
wage contracts in sections IV and V. Consideration of the multi-period structure issues will 
prove to be consequential for two reasons. First, the steepness of the earnings profile will be 
altered over time depending on the worker's initial productivity. Second, the relative rewards 
across states in period 2 following any particular outcome will also be affected. In short, the 
entire structure of subsequent compensation becomes altered so as to generate more effec- 
tive work incentives in the initial period. 
II. The Work Effort Decision 
Consider a situation in which the worker's productivity is uncertain given any level of work 
effort on his behalf. I will assume that in each period either the worker's productivity is high 
or he is unproductive, with a lower level of productivity. The particular state of productivity 
that occurs is a stochastic event influenced by his work effort, but not completely deter- 
mined by it. Both the employer and worker share this uncertainty about the worker's future 
productivity, and each of them can monitor the productivity state that occurs. The role of 
the worker's effort is to enhance the probability p (e) that state a will prevail, in which case 
the worker is productive, where 
p' > 0 and p" < 0 
in the initial period. Within such a binary productivity outcome format, there is no loss of 
generality in setting the worker's output at 1 if the productive state a prevails and at 0 if the 
unproductive state b holds. 
For simplicity, I will assume that there are only two periods to the worker's choice 
problem. This time horizon is long enough to permit the role of learning but sufficiently 
short so that it is possible to find a closed form solution to the worker choice problem. In 
the second period the worker must make a similar effort choice except that the assessed 
probability that the worker will be productive may be different based on the information ac- 
quired about the worker's productivity in period 1. In a situation of heterogeneous workers, 
whether or not the worker is productive initially will provide information regarding the 
worker's underlying ability. In addition, the level of work effort cannot be monitored directly 
so that to create effective incentives rewards will be based on observed performance, not 
worker input. 
The worker's productivity in the initial period will influence the perceived probability 
that the worker will be productive in the second period. The subscript s will denote the 
values of variables conditional on an initial successful job experience, and the subscript 
f will denote variable values conditional on an unfavorable first-period outcome (i.e., a 
failure). 
Using information on the distribution of worker abilities and the relation between work 
effort and productivity, both the employer and worker form a conditional probability p, (es) 
that the worker who expends effort e, will be productive in period 2 after an initial success 
(i.e., state a), where 
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Table I. Summary of Wage Contract Notation 
Period I Period 2 after Success Period 2 after Failure 
Wage in State a Wa Xa Ya 
Wage in State b wb Xb Yb 
Probability that 
State a Occurs p(e) ps(es) pf(ef) 
ps' > 0 and ps, < 0. 
Similarly, after an initial failure where the worker is unproductive in period 1, the chance of 
being productive in period 2 is governed by pf (ef), where 
p; > 0, pf' < 0, 
and 
pf (ey) < P, (es) 
if es = ef.4 
To provide workers with appropriate incentives the firm establishes a contingent con- 
tract whereby the worker is paid a wage that varies depending both on his productivity and 
possibly on the period as well. No restrictions will be placed on this wage structure since the 
focus of the article is on what factors will govern the nature of the wage contract. In the 
initial period the wage payments in states a and b are wa and Wb. Following an initial 
success, the wage pair is given by xa and xb for these two states, and following an initial 
failure they are Ya and Yb. The rewards structure is summarized in Table I. 
The assumption that the firm can vary the wage rate based on the worker's past and 
previous productivity is in the general spirit of the kind of wage flexibility arguments under- 
lying agency theory models. For example, the analysis of optimal contracts in the presence 
of cyclical risks by Hall and Lazear [4] involves a similar range of complexities in terms of 
the design of efficient contracts. Complete leeway in terms of the firm's ability to set worker 
wages may not always be present if the wage is tied to the job rather than the worker.5 In 
such a context, one could recast the model in terms of the firm's ability to assign workers to 
jobs (and consequently set wages) costlessly, but the degree of discretion the firm may have 
in practice may be limited. To the extent that such impediments exist, one can view the 
analysis here as providing an efficient markets reference point which ideally firms hould 
attempt to achieve if it is not too costly to do so. 
Worker preferences Z (M, e) for different outcomes depend positively on the monetary 
reward M and negatively on the level of effort e. I will assume that this utility function is 
additively separable and is of the form6 
Z(M, e) = U(M) - E(e). 
4. The situation of shared information is also assumed to be one of firm-specific information. Experimentation 
that also influences the worker's productivity elsewhere can be modeled similarly, as in Viscusi [14]. 
5. See Williamson, Wachter, and Harris [16] for an extensive discussion of the sources of impediments to efficient 
wage contracts. 
6. The implications of additive separability for multi-attribute utility functions are explored in Keeney and 
Raiffa [5]. 
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The worker is assumed to be risk-averse with respect to monetary gambles, or 
U' 0 and U"<O 0. 
In addition, there is increased disutility associated with higher levels of effort, or 
E'>O 0and E" >0. 
Since the effort allocation is common to both states, the worker's expected utility V in 
period I is given by 
V= p(e)U(wa) + [1-p(e)]U(Wb) - E(e). 
The expected utility in period 2 following a productive outcome in period 1 is given by 
Vs = ps,(es) U(xa) + [1--ps(es)]U(Xb) 
- E(es), 
and following an unproductive outcome it is 
Vf = pf(ef) U(ya) + [I -pf (ef) ]U(Yb) - E(ef). 
In each period the worker's task is to select his optimal level of effort. In period 1, 
however, this effort not only affects the level of V, but it also influences the chance that the 
pertinent second period rewards will be governed by V, or Vf. Because of these interdepen- 
dencies, one must solve the work effort problem with standard dynamic programming 
methods. 
If the worker is productive initially, in period 2 he will pick es to maximize his value of 
V,. The condition governing the choice of e* is that 
0 = ps'[U(Xb) - U(Xa)] - EI'. (1) 
Equation 1 defines the value of e* that leads to the optimal Vs*. The worker continues to 
expend effort until the increased expected utility from raising the chance that state a prevails 
is just offset by the added disutility associated with greater work effort. Similarly, for the 
optimal ef, one has the requirement that the worker set 
0 = Pf'[ U(ya) - U(yb)] - Ef'. (2) 
The value of V/* represents the expected utility evaluated the ef* value that satisfies equation 
(2). 
The worker's initial effort choice is to pick the effort level to maximize his discounted 
expected utility W over both periods. Let the discount factor 0 be the inverse of one plus the 
interest rate. Consequently, he will 
Max W= V + p (e) Vs* + [1-p(e)]Vf*, 
or he will pick e to maximize his current expected utility plus the influence his present effort 
has on discounted expected future utility through its effect on the probability that the worker 
is initially productive. 
The resulting optimal effort condition is that7 
0 = p'[U(wa) - U(Wb) +? (V,- Vf)] - E'. (3) 
7. The second-order conditions are also satisfied here and for es and ef above as well. 
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Work effort is increased until its marginal disutility just equals the increased probability that 
the productive state a will occur, multiplied by the added immediate and deferred rewards 
associated with this outcome. Since V, exceeds Vf, the dynamic aspects of the wage structure 
will give the worker an incentive to work harder than he otherwise would. 
The within-period incentive effects how a consistent pattern in all three cases. Upon 
total differentiation f equations (1-3), one can show that boosting the wage associated with 
a productive work outcome enhances the productivity-related incentive in that period, or 
Oe/8wa > 0, aes /8xa > 0, and aef /8ya > 0, 
and raising the state b wage lowers the incentive to be productive: 
e/8wb < O, des /8xb < 0, and ef /8yb < 0. 
Workers respond in the expected fashion to contemporaneous wage incentives. 
The influence of deferred compensation on immediate incentives is somewhat different. 
Here the principal concern for generating work incentives is not which state prevails in the 
second period but how this payment is linked to whether or not the worker is productive in 
period 1. As a result, both wage payments in period 2 following an initial success will boost 
worker effort, as 
a el/xa > 0 and a el/xb > 0. 
Similarly, higher wages after an unproductive xperience lower initial effort, or 
Se/8ya < 0 and a e/8yb < 0. 
It is these linkages of subsequent wages to the initial effort decision that will establish the 
rationale for manipulating the temporal wage structure as an incentive-generating device. 
The relative magnitude of the incentive efforts cannot be ascertained in general. For 
example, 
ae /8wa = [p'U' (wa)]/(-2Wla e2), 
and 
ae/8xa = [fps U'(xa)]/(-&2W/8e2). 
Without further estrictions on the relation between effort and the probability that the 
worker will be productive as well as other features of the choice problem, one cannot ascer- 
tain whether wa or xa will be more important in inducing worker effort. That there should 
be such an ambiguity in and of itself is somewhat surprising since it suggests that future 
compensation contingent on the worker's initial productivity may be more effective than 
present compensation contingent on the worker's initial productivity. Similar ambiguities 
pertain to the other wage variables as well. In situations where the period 2 chance of being 
productive p, is high, the value of xa will be more important (and xb will be less important). 
Increases in the responsiveness p' of the initial productivity probability to current effort will 
boost the role of wa. The other wage parameters take on importance that varies in similar 
fashion. Deferred compensation does not play a role that is necessarily dominant or sub- 
sidiary, but its relative importance will depend on the particular circumstances. 
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III. Optimal Multi-Period Wage Structures 
The Firm's Decision Problem 
Workers' effort responses with respect to different parameters of the labor contract will be 
taken into account by a firm when making its choice of the wage structure. In this section I 
will first formulate the firm's objective function and then explore the optimality conditions 
and their implications for the firm's wage structure. 
In each period, the firm's expected profits equal the difference between the expected 
output (i.e., the probability that the worker is productive multiplied by his productivity, 
which is 1) and the expected wage bill. In period 1, expected profits are 
rrl =p - pwa - (1-p)Wb ; 
in period 2 following an initially productive outcome, expected profits are 
s = Ps - psXa - (1-ps)Xb ; 
finally, second period expected profits following an unproductive outcome are 
rf- 
= Pf - PfYa - (I-pf)yb . 
The Multi-Period Optimality Conditions 
The appropriate wage structure will hinge in part on whether the worker remains with the 
firm in period 2. Following an initial successful outcome, it will not be optimal for either the 
employer or the worker to terminate the watch.8 The worker's expected productivity has 
increased, and there is assumed to be no change in his external job prospects because any 
information acquired about the worker's productivity is assumed to be firm-specific. The 
worker will not quit provided that the firm does not lower the wage level--a result that will 
be shown to be true below. 
The worker may, however, quit after an unfavorable outcome since the employer may 
lower his wage to take into account the worker's lower expected productivity. For the initial 
model to be considered, I will assume that the alternative wage is not sufficiently attractive 
to induce worker quitting. Relaxing this assumption has only a minor effect.9 
The firm's profits per worker over the two periods are given by 
r = rr + prs + f(l 1-p)rf , 
or 
7r = p + fPPs + 0 (1-p)pf - pwa - (1-p)Wb - I3PPsXa 
- 8p (1-ps)Xb - .(1-P)PfYa P- (1-p)(--pf)yb . 
In competitive quilibrium, the value of w will be driven to zero. 
The firm's task is to design a wage structure that will maximize the worker's discounted 
8. This result is derived more formally for the specific information case considered here in Viscusi [14]. 
9. In particular, if workers can quit and go to another firm, it provides a utility floor after an unfavorable job 
experience and removes Ya and Yb as choice variables. The spirit of the remaining results is unaffected. 
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expected utility, subject to the effort reaction functions derived in section II and the zero 
profit constraint, where X is its shadow price. More specifically, the firm will 
Max G = V + 3pVs + l (1-p)Vf - XAr. W a b,xa 
Xb 'Ya' h 
Differentiating with respect to each of the six wage variables leads, after some simplifi- 
cation, to the following conditions: 
U'(wa) = -A [1 - (I /p) (rr /e)(Oe/8wa)]; (4) 
U'(wb) = -X [1 - (1 /( -p)) (8rr / e) (8 
e /8wb)]; (5) 
U'(xa) = - [ 1 - (1 l/p) (rs/ es) ( es /xa) 
- (1 /lpps) (rr /8 e) (8 e /8xa)]; (6) 
U'(Xb) -- [1 -- (I /(1 -ps)) (rr / es) ( es /xb) 
- (1 /fp (1-ps))(8 r/8e)(8e /xb)]; (7) 
U'(Ya) = - [1 - (1 /pf) (arf /ef) (ef lya) 
- (1/P3 (I1-p)pf)(8/rr8e)(e/ lya)]; (8) 
and 
U'*(yb) -X [1 - (l/(-pf))(Of/ aef)(O ef/8yb) 
- (1 / (1--p) (1-pf)) (8r la e) (8e /yb)]. (9) 
Equations (4) and (5), which are the first-order conditions for the choice of first-period 
wages, are also noteworthy in that they are identical to the wage structure efficiency condi- 
tions that would prevail if the firm were myopic in its wage policy. The only difference in the 
myopic results is that rr pertains to single period profits rather than profits over both periods, 
and the shadow price X may differ. A principal role of equations (4) and (5) below will be to 
provide a reference point to ascertain how the multi-period wage structure differs. 
In addition, these equations are noteworthy in that they indicate that workers will not 
be fully insured against income risks since the marginal utility of wa and wb may differ. The 
optimal wage contract will sacrifice some of the risk spreading capability in order to preserve 
appropriate work incentives. Unlike the full insurance case, the marginal utility of income is 
not equalized across states. The general spirit of this result is consistent with the findings for 
related classes of agency theory models, such as that of Spence and Zeckhauser [ 13], among 
others. 
The conditions for the optimal period 2 wage levels differ from their first period coun- 
terparts in equations (4-5) through the addition of the role of the second period wages in 
influencing initial incentives. Since higher wages Xa and xb following a successful produc- 
tivity experience both augment initial incentives, the levels of these wages is boosted and the 
associated marginal utility of the wage payments is lower than it would otherwise be. 
The opposite result occurs in the case of ya and yb. Higher wage levels in this instance 
would dampen a worker's incentive to expend effort in the initial period. As a consequence, 
the backward disincentive ffect of these wages will tend to reduce these wage levels below 
the amounts that would have prevailed if wage contracts were designed on a single period 
basis. 
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Because the increased incentive licitation capability of multi-period contracts will 
boost the overall evel of effort e, there will be a dampening of the marginal productivity 
of additional effort, 8r /8 e. To the extent hat higher levels of wa and wb also have a 
diminishing effect on e as the other wage components are utilized, the overall impact will be 
to reduce the reliance on initial wage rates as the exclusive incentives mechanism. 
IV. The Design of Efficient Wage Structures 
Implications for the Temporal Wage Structure 
The role of these incentive effects becomes more apparent upon taking ratios of the marginal 
optimality conditions. The tilting over time between the post-success state in the initial 
period is governed by 
U' (xa) / U' (Wa) = [1 - (1 /ps) (rrs / es) (a es /xa) 
- (1 /fpps)(r la/ e) (8 e /xa)]/ 
[1 - (Ip)(8rr /8e)(8e/8wa)] (10) 
and 
U'(Xb) / U'(Wb) = [1 - ( /(I -ps))(rs la es)(a es lb) 
- (1 /fp (1-ps)) (8 la/ e) ( e /xb)] 
[1 - (1/(l1-p))(8rr/8e)(8e/8wb)]. (11) 
The final term in the numerators ofequations (10) and (11) distinguish t ese equations from 
what would have been obtained by taking the ratio using their myopic ounterparts in 
equation (4) and (5). Since both xa and xb have a positive effect on initial effort e, which in 
turn raises profits 7r, the multi-period feature of the contracting problem lowers the numera- 
tor in each case. The ratio of U' (xa) to U' (wa) will be lowered, as will the ratio of U' (Xb) to 
U'(Wb). Since the worker's marginal utility diminishes with the wage level, the ultimate 
effect isto boost the wage level in both states following a success so as to augment initial 
work incentives. 
The relative wage rate following an unproductive first period are determined through a 
similar procedure, as one has the result hat 
U'(ya) / U'(wa) = [1 - (1 /pf)(7rrf l/ef)( e /ya) 
- (1j/(1-p)pf)(87r/8e)(8e/8ya)]/ 
[1 - (1/(1-p))(8rr/8e)(8e/8wa)], (12) 
and 
U'(yb) /U'(wb) = [1 - (1 /(1 -p))(8rr / ef)( ef /8yb) 
- 
(1/13(1--p)(1--p))(8rr/8e)(Oe/8yb)]/ 
[1 - (1/(1-p))(8rr/8e)(8e/8yb)]. (13) 
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In this case the deferred compensation has a disincentive ffect in each instance, as both 
e /8y,a and e /8yb are negative. The final terms in the numerators of equations (12) and 
(13) are consequently positive, implying that the relative marginal utilities of y, and yb 
compared to their period 1 counterparts will be greater. These higher marginal utilities in 
turn imply a lower wage level following an unproductive job outcome, as the overall wage 
structure following a period 1 failure is lowered to provide greater initial incentives for the 
worker to be productive. 
In terms of the tilting of the wage structure over time, one would expect some tilting 
wholly apart from these incentive ffects. If contracts broke even on a within period basis, 
wages would rise following a productive outcome since p, exceeds p. Similarly, wages would 
fall after an unproductive outcome since pf is below p. What the results here indicate is that 
this tilting of the wage structure will be augmented by the desire to use period 2 wages 
to create initial incentives. The wage increase following a success will be greater and the 
decline in the wage structure following a failure will be steeper than it would otherwise 
be. In effect, the extent of merit rating is by an amount that is more than is dictated by 
actuarially fair considerations. 
The likelihood that the effective rates of insurance in the agent's contract would be 
modified based on the first period experience is not surprising. What is striking is that the 
extent of the modifications is greater than would be dictated by within period actuarially 
fair contracts. 
The optimality of a discrepancy between the spot wage and the worker's productivity 
will emerge because of the nature of the dynamic incentives problem. In situations of uncer- 
tain worker productivity, the direction of these incentive-enhancing effects will depend on 
the worker's initial productivity and also on the need to promote the insurance function of 
contracts, which will be considered subsequently. 
This tilting of the wage structure arises in other labor market contexts as well. For 
example, in Lazear [6] it is shown that the firm will offer a steeper age-earnings profile than 
is warranted in order to prevent worker shirking. In that model, the firm withholds ome 
wages until future periods and terminates the worker if he shirks, leading him to lose the 
deferred wages. The analysis here indicates that this result generalizes to a situation in which 
there is underlying uncertainty about the worker's productivity coupled with risk aversion 
on the part of the worker. More important is that there is a considerable strengthening of 
the Lazear result. In his analysis, the contemporaneous wage was independent of the current 
output level so that it could only be through future wage adjustments that incentives could 
be created. The analysis presented here indicates that even when first period wages are 
made contingent on the worker's first period output level that it is desirable to use the 
second period wage structure as well to create work incentives. 
Across-State Differences 
If workers were risk-neutral, one could promote initial incentives quite effectively by making 
the wage w, sufficiently greater than wb. Extreme wage lotteries of this type are not desirable 
in general because of the presence of worker risk aversion, which creates a desire on the part 
of workers to have a wage structure with greater equality across different productivity out- 
comes. This need to promote risk spreading will mute the incentive effect of contracts as 
there is a need to make a tradeoff between the incentive ffects and the insurance function, 
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as was noted in section III. Here I will consider whether or not the wage structure dynamics 
lead to greater equalization of the wage structure across states. 
Consider first he wage structure following a successful period 1 productivity expe- 
rience. The role of the multi-period contract structure considerations is to introduce the final 
term in equations (6) and (7). Since the wage xa will exceed xb to promote work incentives 
in period 2, the value of U' (xa) will be below U'(Xb). The introduction of the dynamic 
incentive terms will narrow the marginal utility differences between the two states if 
(1 /lpps) (r/ la e) (a 
e /xa) < (1 /fPp (1-p)) (8rr /8 e) (8 e /8xb), (14) 
to a condition that reduces to 
U'(Xa) < U'(xb). 
The final terms will consequently dampen the marginal utility gap provided that the mar- 
ginal utility of money is greater in state b. The final terms in equations (6) and (7) could 
never equalize the marginal utility difference since a strict equality would hold in equation 
(14) if U' (x,) equalled U' (xb). With these terms being identical, whether or not the ratio of 
U' (xa) to U'(xb) exceeded I would be governed by the myopic conditions, which lead to 
greater x, and consequently lower U'(xa). Similarly, the dynamic aspects could never pro- 
duce the result that U'(xb) < U'(xa) since such marginal utilities would reverse the in- 
equality sign in equation (14), making it even more desirable to raise xa, making U'(xa) 
even lower than U'(xb). As a result, the multi-period wage structure concerns will narrow, 
but not completely eliminate the marginal utility gap between x, and xb, 
After an adverse initial productivity experience, the gap between ya and yb will be 
widened by the dynamic incentive effects ifthe final terms in equations (8) and (9) satisfy 
(1 /9(1--p)pf)(8 la/e)(8e/8ya) 
> (1 /f(1--p)(1--pf))(8rra e)(e/ lyb), 
or 
U'(ya) < U'(yb). 
Provided that y, exceeds yb, which would be implied by the myopic optimality conditions, 
the multi-period incentive component exacerbates the period 2 wage gap following an 
adverse productivity experience. The effect is in the opposite direction of the across state 
differences following a successful job experience because the y, and Yb terms have a nega- 
tive influence on initial effort e, whereas the xa and xb wages have a positive ffect, hus 
accounting for the opposite signs that result. 
The intuition underlying each result is quite similar. The incentive effect isdriven in 
part by the marginal utility of income in a particular state. When marginal utility levels are 
high, altering the associated wage rate will have a greater effect on work incentives. In the 
absence of any dynamic influences, the state b wage will be lower than the state a wage and 
the associated marginal utility will be greater. Higher wage rates following a productive 
initial period will augment initial incentives and the higher U' (xb) bolsters this influence so 
that a narrowing in the period 2 wages results. Similarly, higher period 2 wages following an 
unproductive job outcome lower initial work incentives. The higher marginal utility asso- 
ciated with U' (yb) consequently implies a greater disincentive ffect, implying that it is even 
more important o lower yb in relation to ya. 
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As in the case of wage tilting, the effects are in the opposite direction depending on the 
initial productivity outcome. The dynamic elements narrow the gap between U'(xa) and 
U' (xb) and widen the gap between U' (ya) and U' (yb). The concern with dynamic incentive 
effects promotes the risk spreading objective in one case and conflicts with this objective in 
the other situation. 
V. Conclusion 
In situations of uncertain worker productivity and risk aversion, labor market contracts 
have a dual objective of promoting incentives and risk spreading. A trade-off between these 
objectives is present in single period models as well as in the multi-period models that were 
the focus of this paper. When there is more than a single period, there will be a divergence 
between the within period expected productivity and the spot expected wage rate as the 
wage structure isutilized to promote the creation of work incentives. In effect, firms will 
merit rate workers on an actuarially unfair basis when viewed within the context of the 
second period. 
No single type of influence results, as the impact differs depending on whether or not 
the worker isproductive inthe initial period. Following an initial period of being productive, 
the wage structure will slope upward more than it otherwise would and there will be a 
narrower within period gap in the wages across productivity states. Similarly, after an 
adverse productivity outcome, the drop in wages will be accentuated and the risk spreading 
properties of the second period wage contract reduced. The common element in each of 
these cases is a reliance on the wage structure to promote incentives. In addition, the 
intrinsic trade-off between risk and incentives that is present in single period models extends 
to multiple periods as there is a desire to sacrifice some of the risk spreading capability of 
period two compensation tobolster the work incentives in an earlier period. 
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